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ABSTRACT 
Security questions are one of the techniques used in fall-back 
authentication to retrieve forgotten passwords. This paper 
proposes a game design which aims to improve usability of 
system-generated security questions. In our game design, we 
adapted the popular picture-based “4 Pics 1 word” mobile 
game. This game asks users to pick the word that relates the 
given pictures. We selected this game because of its use of 
pictures and cues, in which, psychology research has found 
to be important to help with memorability. The proposed 
game design focuses on encoding information to users’ long- 
term memory and to aide memorability by using the follow- 
ing memory retrieval skills: (a) graphical cues - by using 
images in each challenge; (b) verbal cues - by using verbal 
descriptions as hints; (c) spatial cues - by keeping same or- 
der of pictures; (d) interactivity - engaging nature of the 
game through the use of persuasive technology principles. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s Ya- 
hoo! email account was “hijacked” in the run-up to the 2008 
US election. The “hacker” simply used the password re- 
set prompt and answered her security questions [13]. As 
reported [13], the Palin hack didn’t require much techni- 
cal skills. Instead, the hacker merely used social engineer- 
ing techniques to reset Palin’s password using her birth- 
date, ZIP code and information about where she met her 
spouse. The answers to these questions were easily accessi- 
ble with a quick Google search. Also, as more of our per- 
sonal information is available online, it is becoming easier 
for attackers to retrieve this information, through observa- 
tional attacks, from social networking websites, such as Face- 
book [41], Twitter or even more professional websites like 
LinkedIn [11]. Besides observational attacks, security ques- 
tions are also vulnerable to guessing attacks, in which, at- 
tackers try to access accounts by providing low entropy (i.e., 
level of complexity) answers (e.g., favourite colour:  blue). 
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These attacks are part of a series of Cyber-threats which 
usually include computer viruses and other types of mali- 
cious software (malware), unsolicited e-mail (spam), eaves- 
dropping software (spyware), orchestrated campaigns aim- 
ing to make computer resources unavailable to the intended 
users (distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks), social 
engineering, and online identity theft (phishing). Hence, 
the ease of conducting observational and guessing attacks 
has increased the vulnerabilities of fall-back authentication 
mechanisms [31] towards all these cyber-threats, which are 
leading to severe consequences, such as monetary loss, em- 
barrassment and inconvenience [34]. 
A possible way to reduce the vulnerability of security ques- 
tions towards these kind of attacks is by encouraging users to 
use system-generated answers [34]. One particular technique 
uses an Avatar to represent system-generated data of a fic- 
titious person (see Figure 1), and then the Avatar’s system- 
generated data is used to answer security questions [34]. 
However, the main barrier towards widespread adoption of 
these techniques is memorability [30], since users struggle 
to remember the details of system-generated information to 
answer their security questions. 
Thus, to address this problem with memorability of system- 
generated data, in this paper we present a game design that 
focuses on enhancing users’ memorability of answers to se- 
curity questions. This paper investigates the elements (ob- 
tained from the literature [39] [16] [21] [9]) that should be 
addressed in the game design to create and consequently 
nurture the bond between users and their avatar profiles 
(system-generated data). For the purpose of our research, 
we adapted the popular picture-based “4 Pics 1 Word” 1 
mobile game. This game asks users to pick the word that 
relates the given pictures (e.g., for the pictures in Figure 2a 
the relating word would be “Germany”). This game was 
selected because of its use of pictures and cues, in which, 
previous psychology research has found to be important to 
help with memorability [39] [8]. 
For the purpose of our research we adapted the game, so that 
at certain intervals, it asks users to solve avatar-based chal- 
lenges. Since previous research on memorability found that 
recognition is a simpler memory task than recall [49], be- 
sides recall-based challenges (see Figure 3a), in our game, we 
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Figure 1: System-generated Avatar profile as defined 
by Micallef and Just 2011[34] 
 
also provide recognition-based challenges (see Figure 3b)). 
Hence, the proposed game design focuses on encoding the 
system-generated data to users’ long-term memory [8] and 
to aide memorability by using the following memory retrieval 
skills [1]: (a) graphical cues - by using images in each chal- 
lenge; (b) verbal cues - by using verbal descriptions as hints; 
(c) spatial cues - by keeping same order of pictures; and 
(d) interactivity - interactive/engaging nature of the game 
through the use of persuasive technology principles [21]. 
In the following sections, we describe the fall-back authenti- 
cation mechanisms that are currently being used. We then 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of research on secu- 
rity questions to show why our research is important and 
how it is considerably different from previous research that 
has been conducted in this field. Afterwards, we describe 
the main contribution of this paper, which is a unique game 
design that uses gamification and memorability concepts to 
improve the memorability of fall-back authentication. Fi- 
nally, we conclude this paper by outlining our next steps to 
evaluate the proposed game design in both a lab and field 
study. 
2. BACKGROUND 
As computer users have to deal with an increasing number 
of online accounts [20] [46] they are finding it more difficult 
to remember all passwords for their different accounts. For 
example, if we look just at social networking sites, plenty of 
users have different accounts for Facebook, Twitter, Insta- 
gram, SnapChat and LinkedIn. Since password managers 
have not been widely adopted [3], resetting of passwords is 
becoming a more frequent task [20] [46]. To address this 
problem various forms of fall-back authentication mecha- 
nisms have been evaluated with the most popular being 
security questions [44] (focus of this research) and email- 
based password reset. Although email-based (or in some 
cases even SMS-based) password recovery has been widely 
adopted by major organizations (e.g., Google) they still have 
the limitation of being vulnerable to ‘man in the middle’ 
attacks, since these emails are not encrypted [23]. Other 
fall-back authentication mechanisms (e.g., social authenti- 
cation [43]) have also been evaluated, though they have not 
been widely adopted [29], since they are vulnerable to imper- 
sonation both by insiders and by face-recognition tools [33]. 
Security questions are used by a variety of popular organiza- 
tions (e.g., Banks, E-commerce websites, Social networks). 
Security  questions  are  set-up  at  account  creation.   Then 
when they want to reset their password, users will have to 
recall the answers that they provided when setting up the 
account. Several studies have found that security questions 
have the following major limitations: (1) can be guessed by 
choosing the most popular answers [11] [19]; (2) have mem- 
orability problems since they are not frequently used [30], 
which decreases their level of usability [10]; (3) are easily 
guessed by friends, family members and acquaintances [25] [42]; 
(4) can be guessed by observational attacks [24], with a 
quick Google search or by searching victims’ social network- 
ing websites [41]. Recent studies, conducted using security 
questions data collected by Google [10], found that security 
questions are neither usable (low memorability) nor secure 
enough to be used as the main account recovery mechanism. 
This means that new techniques need to be investigated to 
provide a more secure and memorable form of fall-back au- 
thentication. 
In the last years, mobile devices became one of the main 
mediums to access the web and people started storing (and 
accessing) more sensitive information on these devices [37]. 
Hence, the focus of authentication research has shifted to 
primarily investigate new techniques (e.g., data driven au- 
thentication using sensors [32]) to conduct authentication on 
mobile devices [36] [15]. Most of the research in this area 
tried to leverage the use of the variety of inbuilt sensors (e.g., 
accelerometer, magnetometer) that are available on today’s 
mobile devices, with the main goal of striking a balance 
between usability and security when conducting authenti- 
cation [35] [38]. However, sensors have also been used in 
fall-back authentication mechanisms on smartphones [28] as 
a technique that extracts autobiographical information [17] 
about the users’ smartphone behaviour during the last cou- 
ple of days. This information is then used to answer security 
questions about recent smartphone use [2]. Although these 
innovative security questions techniques have managed to 
achieve memorability rates of about 95% using a diverse 
set of questions [27] [26], these techniques have mostly been 
evaluated with a younger user-base (mean age of 26), those 
users that use smartphones the most [40]. Hence, we argue 
that other techniques need to be investigated to cater for 
those users who do not use smartphones or use them but 
not very frequently. 
Besides the previously described work on autobiographical 
security questions, recent research has also investigated: (1) 
life-experiences passwords - which consists of several facts 
about a user-chosen past experience, such as a trip, grad- 
uation, or wedding, etc. [50]; (2) security meters - to en- 
courage users to strengthenv their security answers [45] and 
(3) avatar profiles - to represent system-generated data of 
a fictitious person (see Figure 1), and then the Avatar’s 
information is used to answer security questions [34]. Life- 
experience passwords [50] were evaluated to be stronger than 
passwords and less guessable than security questions. How- 
ever, the memorability after 6 months was still about 50%. 
The work on security meters for security questions [45] seems 
quite promising, however it is still requires further research 
to evaluate its feasibility. 
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Figure 2:  Examples of standard game challenges. 
 
Using system-generated data, in the form of an avatar pro- 
file, to answer security questions [34] has also not been ex- 
tensively investigated. However, in our research we attempt 
to investigate this work further because compared to other 
research on security questions it seems to be the one that 
has the potential to achieve the optimal balance in terms of 
security and memorability due to the following reasons:(1) it 
could be tailored for everyone (and not only for those users 
with medium/high smartphone usage); (2) guessing attacks 
could be minimized because the entropy and variety of the 
answers could be defined/controlled by the system that gen- 
erates them; (3) risks of having observational attacks would 
be minimal since the system-generated avatar information 
would not be publicly available; and (4) memorability could 
be achieved by using a gamified approach to create and nur- 
ture a bond between users and their avatar profiles (in the 
form of system-generated data). 
Bonneau and Schechter found that most users can memo- 
rize passwords when using tools that support learning over 
time [12]. However, we know to our cost, no-one has at- 
tempted to use serious games to improve the users’ memo- 
rability of systems-generated answers for security questions. 
Thus, in our research,  we attempt to use a gamified ap- 
proach to improve users’ memorability during fall-back au- 
thentication because previous work in the security field [5] 
has successfully used this approach to educate users about 
the susceptibility to phising attacks [7] with the aim of teach- 
ing users to be less prone to these types of security vulner- 
abilities [6]. Hence, this paper contributes to the field of 
fall-back authentication by proposing a game design which 
uses long-term memory and memory retrieval skills [1] to 
improve the memorability of security answers based on a 
system-generated avatar profile. 
3. GAME DESIGN 
The main challenge in designing usable security questions 
mechanisms is to create associations with answers that are 
strong and to maintain them over time. In our research 
we use previous findings on the understanding of long-term 
memory to design a game which has the aim of improving 
the memorability of system-generated answers for security 
questions. Atkinson and Shiffrin [8] proposed a cognitive 
memory model, in which, new information is transferred to 
short-term memory through the sensory organs. The short- 
term memory holds this new information as mental repre- 
sentations of selected parts of the information. This infor- 
mation is only passed from short-term memory to long-term 
memory when it can be encoded through cue-association [8] 
(e.g., when we see a cat it reminds us of our first cat). This 
encoding through cue-association helps people to remember 
and retrieve the stored information over an extended period 
of time. These encodings are strengthened through con- 
stant rehearsals. Also, psychology research has found that 
humans are better at remembering images than textual in- 
formation (known as the picture superiority effect) [39]. The 
picture superiority effect has been used in the usable secu- 
rity field to evaluate a wide range of graphical authentication 
schemes [18] [19] [47] [14]. In section 3.1, we describe how 
we use these psychology concepts to adapt the popular “4 
Pics 1 Word” mobile game for the purpose of our research. 
We create encoding associations (bond) with the avatar pro- 
file by using the picture-based nature of this game and by 
adding verbal cues. Then in section 3.2 we describe how 
we strengthen these encodings by having users constantly 
rehearse associations (nurture the bond) through persuasive 
technology principles [21]. 
 
3.1 Game Features 
In most instances, the game functions similarly to the “4 Pics 
1 Word” mobile game, meaning that the game asks players 
to pick the word that relates the given pictures (e.g., for 
the pictures in Figure 2a the relating word would be “Ger- 
many”). However, at certain intervals, the game asks play- 
ers to solve avatar-based challenges. The optimal number of 
times that players will be given avatar-based challenges dur- 
ing a day to learn the system-generated avatar information 
will be investigated in a field study. The game will initially 
provide players with a pool of 12 letters (this number could 
change after that we conduct a detailed entropy evaluation 
of the system-generated data) to assist them with solving 
the challenge. For each given answer, players are either 
rewarded or deducted points based on whether they pro- 
vided the correct or wrong answer (10 points when answer- 
ing standard challenges, 15 points when answering recogni- 
tion avatar-based challenges, 20 points when answering re- 
call avatar-based challenges). Points can be used to obtain 
hints to help in solving more difficult challenges (deduction 
of 30/50 points). 
Researchers in psychology have defined two main theories to 
explain how humans handle recall and recognition: Generate- 
recognize theory [4] and Strength theory [49]. According to 
the generate-recognize theory [4] recall is a two phase pro- 
cess: Phase 1 - A list of possible words is formed by looking 
into long-term memory; Phase 2 - The list of possible words 
is evaluated to determine if the word that is being looked 
for is within the list. According to this theory recognition 
does  not  use  the  first  phase,  hence  it’s  easier  and  faster 
to perform. According to strength theory [49] recall and 
recognition require the same memory tasks, however recog- 
nition is easier since it requires a  lower  level  of  strength. 
When it comes to avatar-based challenges, in our game we 
decided to use both recall and recognition challenges  (see 
Figure 3) because having only recognition challenges would 
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Figure 3: Examples of recall and recognition-based 
avatar  challenges. 
 
have lowered the security level of the game, since the answer 
space would have been very small. Hence, to try and strike 
a balance between security and memorability, we designed 
the avatar challenges part of the game so that it starts by 
showing mostly recognition-based challenges (see Figure 3b). 
Then as players get more accustomed to the avatar profile 
and they learn the system-generated data (strengthening of 
the bond) the avatar-based challenges would become mainly 
recall-based (see Figure 3a). 
Psychology research [4] [48] has shown that it is difficult 
to remember information spontaneously without having any 
kind of memory cues. Hence, we added a feature that shows 
verbal cues about each picture (see Figure 2b). This feature 
can be enabled by using the points (30/50 points) that are 
gathered when solving other game challenges as the player 
goes through the game. We decided to add this feature, es- 
pecially for the avatar-based challenges, so that players can 
focus their attention on associating the words with the cor- 
responding cues (pictures). We hypothesize that this should 
help to process and encode the information in memory and 
store it in the long-term memory [1]. 
We decided to have a fixed set of images and always show the 
same images in the same order because this helps enhanc- 
ing semantic priming [1]. Meaning that it will help players 
recognize the answer by associating it with the other im- 
ages that are presented with it. To improve the security 
element of the game, especially when solving avatar-based 
challenges, our game does not show the length of the word 
that needs to be guessed. This feature makes the game more 
difficult, but we argue that it increases the level of security. 
3.2 Engagement 
To nurture the bond between players and their avatars, we 
will use constant rehearsals to strengthen the encodings of 
associations with the system-generated data, in the play- 
ers long-term memory. We plan to achieve this by using 
the following persuasive technology principles proposed by 
Fogg [21] and also used in [22]: 
Tunnelling: Tunnelling is the process of providing a game 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Examples of rewards and game visualiza- 
tions. 
 
experience which contains opportunity for persuasion [21]. 
Players are more likely to engage in a tunnelling experience 
when they can see tangible results [22].  For this reason, 
at the beginning of the game, the avatar-based challenges 
are mostly recognition-based rather than recall-based. We 
hypothesize that in this way it is less likely that players 
will stop playing the game due to being exposed to difficult 
challenges at the beginning. Also, at this stage of the game 
obtaining hints requires a low amount of points (30). Ad- 
ditional levels of difficulty (recall-based challenges) become 
available only as players either demonstrate sufficient skill, 
or play the game for several days or weeks. As the player 
goes through the game the cost (in points) of buying hints 
or obtain verbal cues will increase as well (50 points). 
Conditioning: According to persuasive technology princi- 
ples [21] players can be conditioned to play a game if they 
are offered rewards to compensate their progress. In our 
game we reward players with points when they solve chal- 
lenges correctly (more points are given when avatar-based 
challenges are solved, recall-based challenges provide more 
points than recognition-based challenges). The more points 
players collect the more hints they can obtain when they 
are struggling to solve other game challenges. We also re- 
ward players with the following badges (see Figure 4) each 
time that they solve avatar-based challenges: (1) a “smiley” 
badge when they solve 1 avatar challenge (see Figure 4a); (2) 
a “cake” badge when they solve half of the daily avatar chal- 
lenges (see Figure 4b); (3) a “trophy” badge when they solve 
all daily avatar challenges (see Figure 4c). Special sounds 
and visualizations are displayed when these badges or an 
important milestone is achieved (see Figure 4d). 
Suggestion: Persuasive technology principles [21] suggest 
that messages and notifications should be well timed in order 
to be more effective. For this reason in our game we send 
notifications to remind players to play the game every 24 
hours, if they did not play the game during that time frame. 
Also, every 24 hours we provide hints when players are stuck 
with a game challenge. 
Self-monitoring: Persuasive technology principles [21] state 
that constantly showing progress can motivate players to 
improve their performance. For this reason in our game we 
show the score and the progress in solving avatar-based chal- 
lenges each time that players play the game. We also show 
graphs on how many avatar-based challenges were solved 
correctly  during  a  day/week/month  and  how  many  chal- 
5 	
lenges still need to be solved to progress to the next stage. 
We hypothesize that these tools will help players identify 
areas for improvement and provide motivation to continue 
playing the game with the aim of improving performance. 
Surveillance and Social Cues: According to persuasive 
technology [21], players are more encouraged to perform cer- 
tain actions if others are aware of these actions and by lever- 
aging social cues. In our game we implement a social ele- 
ment of surveillance by: (1) congratulating players when 
they return to play the game every day; (2) applaud players 
when they reach an important game milestone; (3) encour- 
age players even when they get incorrect answers; (4) express 
disappointment when players don’t play the game regularly. 
Humour, Fun and Challenges: Affect is also an impor- 
tant factor to enhance players’ motivation [22]. To make 
the game more fun we included emoticons when sending re- 
minders or when communicating with players. This is also 
the reason why we selected humoristic badges (smiley, cake, 
trophy ) to reward players when they reach avatar-related 
milestones(see Figure 4). Our motivation is to keep players 
interested and engaged in playing the game. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The proposed game design outlined in this paper teaches 
and nudges users to provide stronger answers to security 
questions to protect themselves against observational and 
guessing attacks. Since this technique uses system-generated 
data, it is quite unlikely that attackers would be able to re- 
trieve the avatar-based answers from google searches/social 
networks or through guessing attacks. We believe that help- 
ing users to memorise the avatar’s system-generated data 
through an engaging/interactive gamified approach can help 
users create and nurture a bond with their avatar. This 
will be achieved by encoding information in long-term mem- 
ory through constant rehearsals with the aim of improving 
memorability of fall-back authentication (i.e., security ques- 
tions). In our future work, we will conduct studies to involve 
users in this game design to further optimize the functional- 
ities of the game and determine any security vulnerabilities 
that need to be addressed (by defining the entropy that the 
system-generated data used by the avatar profile needs to 
have, in order for this system to achieve the required level 
of security). Afterwards, we will conduct a field study to 
evaluate different rehearsal configurations to determine the 
optimal rehearsal parameters that need to be adopted so 
that users could use this game to learn and remember the 
system-generated avatar profile. 
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